This paper investigates the relation between cross listing in the U.S., with its resulting commitment to increased disclosure, and the information environment of non-U.S. firms. We find that firms that cross-list on U.S. exchanges have greater analyst coverage and increased forecast accuracy relative to firms that are not cross listed. A time-series analysis shows that the change in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy occurs around cross listing. We also document that firms that have more analyst coverage and higher forecast accuracy have higher valuations. Further, the change in firm value around cross listing is correlated with changes in analyst following and forecast accuracy suggesting that cross listing enhances firm value through its effect on the firm's information environment. Our findings support the hypothesis that crosslisted firms have better information environments, which are associated with higher market valuations.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine cross listing in the U.S. and its relation to the information environment of non-U.S. firms.
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A large literature on international cross listing suggests that information considerations are a key factor in cross-listing decisions. However, there is little direct empirical evidence on the relation between cross listing and the information environment of the firm. We document several empirical findings on this subject. First, we show crosssectionally that non-U.S. firms that are listed on U.S. exchanges have greater analyst coverage and increased forecast accuracy relative to other non-U.S. firms. Second, we perform time series analyses and find that a change in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy occurs around crosslisting. Third, we document that analyst coverage and forecast accuracy are both positively related to firm value. Finally, we show that the change in value around cross listing is correlated with changes in analyst following and forecast accuracy, suggesting that cross listing increases firm value through its effect on the firm's information environment. Our results are robust to adjustments for the potential endogeneity of the listing decision and simultaneity between analyst following and forecast accuracy. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that there are important informational effects that occur with cross listing and that these effects are positively associated with firm value.
Papers by Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Miller (1999) document positive average abnormal returns for non-U.S. firms that issue exchange-listed American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). These papers and others offer a number of explanations for why cross listing on U.S. stock exchanges adds value. 2 However, a crucial component in almost all of these explanations is the firm's information environment. The notion that the information environment should be a function of cross listing is natural, as one of the most salient features of exchange-listed ADRs is that their issuance requires the non-U.S. firm to comply with SEC regulations and reconcile their accounts to U.S. GAAP. Firms that list in U.S. markets are, in effect, committing to an increased level of disclosure and scrutiny because of U.S. filing regulations and stock exchange requirements. These changes in transparency could affect firm value by decreasing the cost of capital, increasing the cash flows that ultimately accrue to shareholders, or both.
For the cost of capital, Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis is often used to argue that a U.S. listing creates value because the enhanced disclosure environment reduces the cost of following the firm. This increases the investor base and, therefore, the demand for the firm's securities. Barry and Brown (1985) suggest that cost of capital is a function of "estimation risk" and the better investors are able to assess the prospects for a company, the lower its expected cost of capital. Along this line of reasoning, Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that analysts' forecasts are more accurate for firms that disclose more, while Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2000) find that firms with more accurate forecasts enjoy a lower implied cost of capital in valuation. Thus, if investors are able to more accurately assess the prospects for a cross-listed firm, its cost of capital should be reduced. Taken together, these investor recognition and estimation risk hypotheses suggest that a firm's information environment can play an important role in determining its cost of capital.
The literature also suggests that information the information increase associated with cross listing can influence value through pure cash flow effects by reducing agency costs. For example, cross listing may be associated with improved firm-level corporate governance because it bonds a firm to greater transparency, which should reduce the potential diversion of a firm's cash flows to managers and controlling shareholders [Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999) ].
Consistent with this hypothesis, recent research by Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2001) documents that a U.S. listing creates the most value for firms with higher growth opportunities located in countries that have poor disclosure and investor protections. Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2001) , Reese and Weisbach (2002), and Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002) argue that cross-listing adds value because the associated disclosure and regulatory discipline increases even local investors' willingness to commit capital.
Despite its theoretical importance, there is surprisingly little direct evidence on the relation between a firm's information environment and cross listing. 3 One factor that makes testing this relation difficult is that it is not possible to directly measure a firm's information environment. For instance, Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2002) use price volatility and volume reaction to earnings announcements to conduct tests on the information environment of crosslisted firms. Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) test whether "visibility" increases around cross listing with measures of analyst following and media coverage. Our approach is to follow prior research by Lang and Lundholm (1996) , Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2000) and use the characteristics of analyst forecasts as a proxy for the information environment. In particular, we focus on two measures: the number of analysts Janakiramanan (1987 Janakiramanan ( , 1988 , see the survey by Karolyi (1998) . 3 There is a substantial body of research examining the nature of reconciling items for cross listed firms as reported on Form 20-F (summarized in Pownall and Schipper, 1999) . Much of that literature examines the association between reconciling items and share prices to infer whether the information in reconciliations is "value relevant" and generally finds a significant association. However, evidence on whether the Form 20-F is the source of the information is mixed since the information release date is generally not clear. Our interest is different in that we are not concerned about whether specific reconciling items are associated with share price but, rather, whether the additional information dissemination about cross listed firms affects characteristics of their general information environment.
following the firm and the accuracy of analyst forecasts. Previous studies suggest that having more analysts with more accurate forecasts is indicative of a firm with a better information environment. 4 Analyst following should be related to cross listing and value for several reasons. First, to the extent that cross listing increases the quantity of information available to the market, it should reduce the cost of following a firm, which could lead to increased coverage by investment analysts. Second, cross listing widens the potential investment base of a firm. This should be associated with increased analyst activity because analysts are likely to focus on firms which investors find interesting and investors are more likely to consider firms followed by analysts.
These predictions are also consistent with the investor relations literature, which suggests that a benefit of increased disclosure is increased analyst following. Finally, additional analyst following should also bring about more scrutiny, which, in the presence of agency costs, should improve firm value by increasing the cash flows that accrue to shareholders. In summary, increased analyst following around cross-listing can influence aspects of the firm's information environment that have been argued to affect both cash flows and the cost of capital.
The above arguments suggest that the firm's disclosures and the information production by analysts are complements. Consistent with this hypothesis, Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) find that, for U.S. firms, increased disclosure is associated 4 Following the prior literature, we view the analyst variables as indicative of, but not necessarily the cause of, changes in a firm's information environment. For example, analyst forecast accuracy is intended as a measure of how well the market understands the firm's economics. This may partially be a result of analyst activity, but it may also reflect disclosure by the firm or information gathering by other investors. Similarly, analyst following is intended to proxy for private information acquisition activities. While the analysts' research may indeed enhance the information environment, the same incentives that attract sell-side analysts might also attract buy-side analysts and other investors. Further, our two measures are not intended as mutually exclusive. For example, forecasts for a given firm may be more accurate because there are more analysts following the firm. Similarly, we do not believe the two measures are entirely redundant; forecasts may be accurate because a firm discloses more without more analysts following. Our empirical tests take these two measures into account both separately and simultaneously. 5 We focus our discussion on sell-side analysts since the IBES data are primarily based on their forecasts with higher analyst following. Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2001) find similar results internationally.
Our paper also examines the ex post accuracy of analyst forecasts. To the extent that cross listing increases the amount of information available about the firm, it can be argued that it will improve the accuracy of analyst forecasts. Improved accuracy should then reduce the cost of capital through its effect on estimation risk. As noted earlier, Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2000) find that firms with lower forecast errors have lower implied costs of capital. Improved accuracy may also lessen agency problems to the extent that managers are held more accountable for the details of their firm's cash flows.
To sum up the theoretical arguments on cross listing, much of the literature implies that cross listed firms have a richer information environment relative to non-cross listed firms.
Empirically, there is support for the notion that a richer information environment for a firm leads to more analysts with more accurate forecasts. This paper adds to the literature by examining analyst activity around cross listing to see if, in fact, the activity is consistent with the hypothesis that cross-listing is associated with improvements in the firm's information environment. We then, in turn, investigate whether these changes in the information environment are linked to firm value.
It is important to note that while there exists empirical support for the positive relation between analyst activity and increased disclosure, the association is not obvious. For instance, Lang and Lundholm (1996) note that to the extent that extra disclosure levels the playing field among analysts, it could reduce any one analyst's competitive advantage, which would lessen incentives to cover the firm. Botosan (1997) finds that when firms already have a high analyst following, increased disclosure is not associated with a reduction in the cost of capital.
Similarly, the prediction that the required US GAAP reconciliation by exchange-listed firms leads to higher forecast accuracy is not obvious. While cross-listed firms are not required to change local GAAP reporting when they list on US markets, Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2001) suggest that firms change in ways that make earnings more volatile and more similar to US firms. 6 For example, firms may adopt more market-value-based reporting to be closer to US GAAP, which might make earnings harder to predict. Similarly, non-U.S. analysts may find it harder to predict earnings following a movement toward US GAAP because they are more familiar with the local GAAP. To the extent that earnings become less predictable around cross listing, it should bias against our finding results. Further, we explicitly include controls for earnings surprise in our analysis, which should mitigate the effects of increased volatility.
However, it is not obvious ex ante how cross listing will affect analyst activity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 examines the impact of cross listing on analyst following and forecast accuracy. Section 4 details the impact of analyst following and performance on firm value. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
Data
To examine the firm's information environment, we focus much of our analysis on the levels of our information variables and consider our changes analysis as supplementary. We take this approach for several reasons. First, the predictions from the prior literature for the level 6 Ball (2001) discusses the evidence on cross-country differences in accounting and concludes that environments like the US focus on the timely recognition of losses (rather than smoothing them over time), consistent with an increase in earnings volatility after cross listing. Similarly, Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2002) find that stock return and volume reactions to earnings announcements typically increase once a stock cross-lists in the U.S., suggesting that earnings becomes less predictable and more informative. of the information environment following cross listing are clearest. In particular, depending on the view of cross listing, it is possible to envision situations in which information environment is important, but is not necessarily reflected in changes around cross listing. For example, as argued in papers like Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Coffee (1999) , the important aspect of cross listing from a valuation perspective is the commitment (or "bonding") to increased disclosure rather than the increase in disclosure itself. Cantale (1998 ), Fuerst (1998 ), Moel (1999 ), and Huddart, Hughes, and Brunnermeier (1999 argue that a firm that has history of transparency will still have an incentive to list because it signals its commitment to continuing that policy, even when it faces circumstances under which it might wish not to disclose.
Following this reasoning, in Doidge et al (2001) the decision to cross list is indicative of a firm with well-aligned incentives that is therefore willing to submit itself to scrutiny. It is important to note, however, that the firm may have also had a rich information environment prior to the cross listing.
Closely related, even if the information environment explicitly changes because of the cross listing, the timing may not be clear. For example, it is unlikely that a firm anticipating a US listing would increase disclosure suddenly following the listing or that analysts would suddenly increase their activity. Rather, based on prior research, it seems likely that firms increase disclosure gradually in anticipation of the listing, moving their accounting closer to US GAAP and increasing their footnote disclosure. 8 As a result, it is difficult to know the window over which to compute the change. We consider long windows to increase the probability that we capture the entire effect, recognizing that longer windows increase the probability of confounding effects. Finally, evaluating changes substantially reduces sample size and our ability to include historical control variables since the I/B/E/S international dataset only begins large-scale coverage in the early to mid 1990s, and most cross listed firms became listed prior to the mid 1990s.
To examine the extent and accuracy of analyst activity, we utilize data from the Historical I/B/E/S International database. The main results of the paper are for the year 1996.
This year was chosen because the year-to-year increase in I/B/E/S coverage of firms begins to slow substantially after 1996 and we want to capture any benefits of ADR listings as far back in time as possible. We use data from the eleventh month of the fiscal year to calculate the number of analysts following a company and the forecast accuracy, as O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) document that analyst activity levels off after the eleventh month. Forecast accuracy is defined as the negative of the absolute value of the analyst forecast error, deflated by stock price:
To identify firms listing on US markets, we gather information on ADR listings on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. This information is obtained from the Bank of New York, the NYSE, NASDAQ and the CRSP databases. Exchange-listed foreign firms are required to register 9 Given that it is not clear when the analyst variables should be computed in this context, we replicated the results using earnings forecasts in the seventh month of the fiscal year. Because firms are required to file Form 20-F within six months of their fiscal year-end, this should ensure that the previous year's filing is available to the market. While we lose some observations because analyst following tends to increase during the year, all results are robust to use of the alternate month.
their offering under the 1933 Securities Act and their reports under the 1934 Exchange Act. That is, the company must meet some SEC disclosure requirements and reconcile to U.S. GAAP.
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We treat direct listings by Canadian and Israeli firms that cross-list in the U.S. as "ADRs" since these firms must also comply with U.S. GAAP. We verify that all of our results hold if these two countries are removed from the sample.
Since we are also interested in how the characteristics of analyst forecasts translate into value, we obtain valuation data from Worldscope. We use Tobin's Q as a measure of firm value in regressions that feature analyst activity and accuracy as well as control variables.
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Tobin's Q is computed as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity in the numerator and book value of assets in the denominator.
Our potential sample of firms from countries covered by I/B/E/S in 1996 that also have one or more exchange-listed ADR firms contains 8937 observations. When we match firms from I/B/E/S with Worldscope, we use the reference I/B/E/S tickers and Worldscope SEDOLs listed in the Datastream database. We augment this process with hand matches based on firm names across the I/B/E/S and Worldscope databases. Inclusion of Worldscope variables reduces our sample substantially. Overall, the sample with I/B/E/S analyst forecast data for fiscal year 1996 includes 4859 firms from 27 countries. Consistent with Chang, Khanna, and Palepu (2000), we find wide variation across counties in analyst following and forecast accuracy. The median earnings forecast error is 0.52 percent of market value and the median firm is followed by 4 analysts. Table 1 also reports sample statistics for the portion of the sample that has three years of historical earnings data. This sample will be used to control for historical volatility in earnings and returns-earnings correlation, which may affect our basic regression results. In general, the two samples are similar in terms of forecast accuracy and analyst following.
The Effect Of Cross Listing On Analyst Coverage and Performance

Empirical Methodology
If there are information effects associated with cross-listing, we expect to see a relation between cross-listing and the characteristics of a firm's information environment.
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It is clearly important to control for other factors besides cross listing that are also likely to affect the information environment across firms. As such, we follow the models used in Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996) for our primary specifications and estimate OLS regression models of the following form: Stulz, 1994) , takeovers (Servaes, 1991) , equity ownership (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002), and hedging (Allayannis and Weston 2001) . 13 We do not use forecast dispersion as an information measure since it is not clear either theoretically or empirically how forecast dispersion affects the information environment of the firm (see Lang and Lundholm 1996 , Harris and Raviv 1993 and Kandel and Pearson 1995 . However, in tests not reported here, we rerun our analysis using forecast dispersion and find that it is not significantly related to cross-listing or firm value and its inclusion does not affect any of our other results. Returns-earnings correlation = The correlation between returns and earnings over the previous three years.
Earnings surprise = The absolute value of the difference between current earnings per share and earnings per share from the prior year, divided by the firm's stock price.
Industry controls: Indicator variables for IBES industry classification (over 100
classifications that broadly correspond to 2-digit SIC codes).
We estimate our first set of regression models with a relatively parsimonious set of control variables in order to maximize the number of observations and power of our tests.
Because we are interested in whether cross listing improves the information environment of a firm, we focus on the coefficient of XLIST. Firm size, measured as the log of total assets converted to U.S. dollars, is included in all regressions since larger firms are likely to have more analysts covering them (Bhushan, 1989 and Brennan and Hughes, 1991) and a better disclosure policy (Lang and Lundholm, 1996) , leading to better accuracy. 14 To control for industry effects, we include IBES industry classification dummies that broadly correspond to 2-digit SIC codes.
To control for cross-country effects, we estimate all the regression models using country random effects. We verify that the Hausman test does not reject the null that country effects are random.
We estimate a second set of models with control variables suggested by Lang and Lundholm (1996) . These additional controls are the standard deviation of returns, the historical correlation between returns and earnings, and the earnings surprise. These are likely to affect forecasts because they affect analysts' incentives to gather information. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that return variability is negatively related to the number of analysts following a U.S. firm, indicating that analysts prefer to follow firms with less performance variability. King, Pownall, and Waymire (1990) find that analyst following is positively related to the returnsearnings correlation for U.S. firms, indicating that the incentives for private information gathering are greater when earnings and returns are highly correlated. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find the opposite relation. Finally, Lang and Lundholm (1996) include the percentage earnings surprise to control for the fact that forecast characteristics are likely to be affected by the magnitude of the earnings information to be disclosed. As a result, the effect on accuracy can be interpreted as the value that analysts bring in forecasting earnings relative to a naïve random walk model. We estimate one final regression model that has additional control variables found in Alford and Berger (1999) and Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) . These papers postulate that the amount of new equity raised during the year might affect analyst coverage of a firm. We proxy 14 We use assets rather than the market value of equity as our size control because we hypothesize that stock market valuation is a function of the firm's information environment. Inclusion of industry controls should mitigate the effects of differences in tangible asset intensity across firms. In a prior version of the paper, we used the market value of equity as a size control with similar results. Results are also consistent if we use the log of sales. for this measure, called "stock," in our analyst regression using the difference in book equity between years. Both papers also use a "fundamental" variable intended to capture signals plausibly related to forecast accuracy. Following Alford and Berger (1999), we include in our accuracy regression a composite "fundamental" variable that sums the number of fundamental variables in the extreme quartiles of the distribution in year t-1 and is divided by the number of available variables. The fundamental variables are taken from Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) , and comprise an inventory signal (the percentage change in inventory minus the percentage change in sales), an accounts receivable signal (the percentage change in accounts receivable minus the percentage change in sales), a gross margin signal (the percentage change in sales minus the percentage change in gross margin), a sales efficiency signal (the percentage change in selling and administration expenses minus the percentage change in sales) and a tax rate signal. 
The Relation between Cross Listing and Analyst Coverage
To examine the relation between cross listing and analyst coverage, we estimate variants of our basic equation with the number of analysts as the dependent variable. Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates. Model 1 shows that after controlling for firm size, country, and industry, firms that cross-list in the U.S. and reconcile to U.S. GAAP have an average of 3.28 more analysts covering the firm. The model has an adjusted R 2 of 30%.
Model 1 does not include any historical earnings data, which increases sample size. In models 2 and 3 we investigate whether our results are robust when we require data on these additional control variables. In all specifications, the coefficient on XLIST is significant and similar in magnitude to the full sample results. For example, Model 2 indicates that firms that 15 Our computation of the "fundamental" variable follows closely the procedure used in Table 2 of Alford and cross-list in the U.S. have an average of 3.27 more analysts covering the firm (compared to 3.28 in Model 1). Overall, the control variables have the expected signs and are generally significant.
For example, analyst coverage is positively related to firm size. Model 2 also shows that analyst coverage is positively related to the correlation between returns and earnings and negatively related to the standard deviation of returns and the size of the earnings surprise. Model 3 shows that the coefficient on our proxy for new equity issues is correctly signed and significant. The relation between XLIST and analyst coverage remains positive and significant.
Overall, the results contained in Table 2 suggest that cross listing is associated with greater analyst following. This finding is consistent with the notion that cross listing lowers the cost of following the firm, which, in turn, leads to increased coverage of the firm by investment analysts. In addition, the finding of increased analyst activity is consistent with an increase in the firm's shareholder base, since Bhushan and O'Brien (1990) document a strong correlation between institutional investors and analyst following. Therefore, our findings provide support for the hypothesis that cross listing improves the information environment of the firm, at least as measured by analyst following. Furthermore, since changes in the shareholder base have been linked to changes in stock returns around cross-listing (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999) , the increase in analyst activity may indeed lead to an increase in shareholder value. We return to this possibility later.
The Relation between Cross-Listing and Forecast Accuracy
In this section, we investigate the association between cross listing and the information environment of the firm by examining analysts' forecast accuracy. If cross listing increases the Berger (1999) , with the exception that we do not make industry adjustments for changes in capital expenditures and type and quantity of financial information disclosed by the firm, then analysts should be able to more accurately predict the earnings of foreign firms. We test this by re-estimating our basic equation (1) with forecast accuracy as the dependent variable.
Model 1 of Table 3 shows that after controlling for firm size, country, and industry effects, the coefficient on XLIST is positive and significant (0.0056, p-value=0.04 ). This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the increased disclosure associated with cross-listing provides analysts with more complete and reliable information with which to predict earnings. It also provides international support for the findings of Lang and Lundholm (1996) that increased disclosure reduces analyst earnings forecast errors for U.S. firms. Models 2 and 3 confirm that these results are robust when we include the additional historical earnings controls. Again, signs on the control variables are generally consistent with the prior literature. Forecast accuracy is greater for larger firms and firms with a higher correlation between returns and earnings, and is lower for firms with more volatile returns and in years in which there are large earnings surprises.
Endogeneity issues
A potential concern with the preceding analysis is endogeneity. Suppose, for example, that firms with high analyst following or high forecast accuracy tend to cross list for reasons unrelated to their information environment, and that this is not captured by our controls or country and industry effects. Then, we might infer a link between information variables and cross listing when none exists. To mitigate this potential issue, we apply a self-selection model that controls for this bias and re-estimate Tables 2 and 3. Similar to Doidge et al. (2001), we model the decision to cross list as a function of the country-level variables, including the legal origin and the aggregate liquidity ratio. We also include firm size as an explanatory variable since it is likely to be the most important firm-level effect. We obtain consistent estimates via full Maximum Likelihood estimation.
16 Table 4 reports results for the forecast accuracy and analyst following regressions after controlling for potential selection bias. The explanatory variables are generally significant in the listing regression. Consistent with expectations, cross listing firms tend to be larger firms from countries with an English legal tradition (the indicator variable excluded from the regression) with less liquid local markets. More important, with the selection bias correction, results remain very similar to those reported earlier, with forecast accuracy and analyst following still significantly associated with cross listing. In particular, XLIST in both models is correctly signed and is significant at the 1% critical level. Subject to the limitations of this approach, it does not appear that endogeneity drives the previous OLS empirical results. 16 A Heckman (1979) two-step estimation procedure produces similar results.
Another potential concern is that we have misspecified our models by estimating the analyst following regression separately from the forecast accuracy model. In particular, Alford and Berger (1999) suggest that analyst forecast accuracy and analyst following may be simultaneously determined. To assess this, we specify two models similar to those contained in Alford and Berger (1999) . We model analyst coverage as a function of forecast accuracy, cross listing and stock, and we model forecast accuracy as a function of analyst coverage, cross listing, the standard deviation of returns and fundamentals. Results are presented in Table 5 . Again, the simultaneous equations results are consistent with our main results in Tables 2 and 3 . In particular, the positive relation between cross listing and analyst following and forecast accuracy remains significant and very similar to the earlier results even after taking into account potential simultaneity.
Time-Series Estimation
Our cross sectional analysis establishes a link between cross listing and a firm's information environment. Further, the results are robust to our adjustments for potential endogeneity and simultaneity. However, a cross sectional analysis is unable to shed light on the extent to which the information environment changes around cross listing. For example, it could still be case that only firms with high analyst following and accurate forecasts choose to crosslist and our controls have not successfully mitigated that effect. An alternate approach that allows us to assess to what extent observed differences between ADR and non-ADR firms are due to self selection is to use time-series data for ADR firms to examine how the information environment changes before and after cross-listing. If we are simply documenting self selection, we should not observe significant changes in information production around the cross-listing period.
Our time-series tests consist of regressions estimated using panel data on analyst activity around the time of the ADR listing. As noted earlier, a problem with this approach is determining the window over which to expect the change. For instance, it can be argued that cross-listing firms will incrementally change their reporting strategies in advance of the formal adoption of US GAAP. We choose to use a long "event" window, including the three years prior to and after cross listing, to increase our confidence that we do in fact capture the entire effect and have enough observations to ensure reliable measures of our dependent variables. The cost of this approach is that it reduces our sample size to 59 firms, which lessens the power of our statistical tests.
The dependent variable in our regressions is either the number of analysts or forecast accuracy. To capture whether there has been a change in analysts or accuracy, we construct a "Post-ADR" dummy variable set equal to one for the years in the panel dataset that fall after the firm has issued its exchange-listed ADR. Since the event is centered on the year of the ADR, that year is removed from the regressions. All regressions include firm fixed effects and are reported with robust standard errors with firm clusters that account for a lack of independence between the observations of each firm. Firm fixed effects implicitly control for the calendar year of each ADR firm, which helps to ensure that our results are not driven by a subset of years in which analyst following or forecast accuracy increased for other reasons.
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The time-series 17 A related concern is whether we might be capturing the effects of general changes in forecast accuracy or analyst following for the population of firms as a whole. To address this possibility, we computed a measure of excess accuracy and excess analyst following by subtracting off median analyst accuracy and following, by country and year, for all sample firms over $100 million in size. Results are similar for this analysis, suggesting that the observed changes for the cross listed firms were not experienced by firms more generally. distribution of our sample ADRs is as follows (number of ADRs per year is in parentheses): 1990 (5), 1991 (10), 1992 (7), 1993 (9), 1994 (14), 1995 (10), 1996 (4).
It would be optimal to also control for contemporaneous changes in the historical earnings variables, standard deviation of returns and returns-earnings correlation, in our time series models. Unfortunately, we cannot include these controls from our cross-sectional regressions because each variable requires three years of historical data to compute, and our time-series analysis already requires three years of data prior to the ADR listing date. The I/B/E/S data do not go back far enough to make these controls feasible. Further, we cannot include total assets because doing so requires matching to Worldscope, which substantially reduces sample size. We include the firm's prior year stock return as a simple contemporaneous control to capture the possibility that analysts may be drawn to firms with higher returns to shareholders. We also include earnings surprise in these models since it, too, requires only one year of historical earnings data. Including these two control variables causes us to lose the initial pre-ADR observation for 14 of our firms. We also lose three observations due to fiscal month changes. Thus, our panel for the 59 firms is slightly unbalanced (337 observations compared to an expected 354 observations). For robustness, we re-estimate our models using only the first two post-ADR years when the initial pre-ADR year is missing due to data omissions (thus obtaining a balanced panel), and find that our results are unchanged (not tabulated). Table 6 shows that our information variables significantly increase around cross listing.
Model 1 of Panel A shows that firms pick up an additional 3.81 analysts after cross listing. This coefficient is larger than the analyst coefficients of Tables 2, 4, and 5. Our results are consistent with Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) who also document that analyst coverage increases substantially following cross listing. Model 2 of Table 6 shows analyst forecasts become more accurate after cross-listing, and the coefficient is again larger than those of Tables 3, 4 and 5.
Overall, the evidence contained in Table 6 indicates that self-selection is not exclusively driving the previous cross-sectional results. We interpret these findings as additional support for our cross-sectional analysis that the information environment, as represented by the increased analyst coverage and forecast accuracy, improves around a U.S. cross listing.
In sum, the evidence in the preceding sections suggests that cross listing in the U.S. and the associated commitment to increase disclosure allow firms to enjoy greater analyst coverage and increased forecast accuracy relative to other firms that are not cross-listed. Taken together, these findings provide empirical support for the notion that the cross-listing is associated with a significantly improved informational environment relative to those firms that are not cross-listed.
The requirement that foreign firms must adhere to U.S. GAAP is one of the most visible aspects of cross-listing on a U.S. exchange. Our findings suggest that U.S. listing does indeed positively affect the ability of analysts to gather and process information regarding the firm. We next investigate whether this increase in information production translates into a higher firm value.
The Relation between Analyst Coverage and Performance and Firm Value
Tobin's Q is our proxy for firm value and this data is obtained for our sample firms from Worldscope. There are 5539 firms with 1996 I/B/E/S analyst data for which fiscal-year 1996
Tobin's Q can be computed. Table 7 reports the results of regression models in which Tobin's Q is regressed on both forecast accuracy and the number of analysts as well as controls. Since country level factors such as investor protections can have important implications for firm value (LLSV 2002, Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2001 ), we employ country controls. Again, we implement the treatment effect model to account for potential endogeneity using the same decision criteria as in Table 4 . Table 7 shows that after controlling for firm size, industry, and country of domicile, the coefficient on forecast accuracy is positive and significant (1.0911, p-value=0.02). This finding suggests that when analyst forecasts are more accurate, firm values are higher. This higher valuation is consistent with Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) results suggesting that firms with lower forecasts errors tend to have a lower implied cost of capital or higher expected cash flows. It also supports the hypothesis that firm value is a function of estimation risk, and that the better investors are able to assess the prospects of a company, the greater is firm value.
Table 7 also shows that the coefficient on the number of analysts is positive and significant (0.025, p-value=0.00). This evidence indicates that firm value is increasing in analyst following. Since analyst following is likely to be correlated with investor following, the higher valuation is consistent with a lower cost of capital or with reduced agency costs. Since both forecast accuracy and analyst coverage are positively and significantly related to firm value, this suggests that cross-listing may indeed increase value by improving the information environment of the firm. For example, if firms that cross-list pick up an additional 3.81 analysts and a 0.015 increase in accuracy (from the time-series analysis in Table 6 ), this would translate into an increase of 11.2% in firm value.
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These results are robust to the inclusion of the cross listing variable, suggesting that it is not simply the case that we are capturing the higher valuations of cross-listed firms documented in Doidge et al. (2001) . On the other hand, the cross listing variable is also significant in the presence of forecast accuracy and the number of analysts, indicating that information effects (at least as we measure them) do not alone explain the higher valuations of cross-listed firms.
Time-Series Estimation
To document an incremental effect of analyst following and forecast accuracy on firm value around the cross listing, we need tests that control for other factors associated with cross listings and increased disclosure, which may, in turn, affect firm value. For instance, our prior analysis indicates that analyst following and forecast accuracy increase around cross listing and we know from prior research that cross-listing firms, in general, have positive returns. Therefore, we are concerned that a documented positive relation between changes in information variables and changes in value could simply capture that phenomenon.
The crux of our valuation question is whether firms that experience the greatest improvement in their information environment enjoy the greatest valuation benefits to cross listing. To answer this question, we implement a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we use our models that explain analyst following and forecast accuracy to predict the expected levels of these measures for each firm for each year from 1990 to 1998. Next, for our cross-listed sample firms, we obtain the residuals from these models, which correspond to the levels of "excess analysts" and "excess forecast accuracy" for each cross-listed firm by year. Since the coefficients of these models are determined from the full sample of firms, we are able to determine the cross-listed firm's "expected" information environment (in terms of analyst following and forecast accuracy) based on its overall firm attributes.
Our specific approach to obtain predicted and residual values in each year is to regress either analyst coverage or forecast accuracy on firm size, the standard deviation of returns, the return to earnings correlation, and the earnings surprise. The models used correspond to Model 2 of Tables 2 and 3 , with the exception of our size control, which uses the market value of equity from I/B/E/S rather than a firm's total assets. This substitution avoids a substantial loss of observations in the early years due to poor Worldscope coverage.
We next compute Tobin's Q values for our cross-listed firms for each year from 1990 to 1998. Finally, we conduct a regression analysis (estimated with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors) in which the dependent variable is the change in Tobin's Q from the year before the ADR to the year after the ADR. This two-year window allows us to include 66 firms in the analysis -enlarging the window beyond two years is not feasible, as it would reduce the sample by half. The independent variables in the regression are the changes in the residual levels of analyst coverage and forecast accuracy from the year before the ADR to the year after the ADR.
Our argument is that if changes in the information environment are important benefits to cross listing, we should see a positive association; firms that benefit the most from cross listing should be those for which cross listing more significantly improves their information environment. Table 8 presents results from this analysis. Our results show that an improved information environment around cross listing is associated with an increase in firm valuation. In particular, there is a positive association between the change in Tobin's Q and the change in "excess analysts" and "excess forecast accuracy." Models 1 and 2 in the table estimate the effects separately, and Model 3 indicates that changes in both "excess analysts" and "excess forecast accuracy" are important in explaining changes in firm value. We conclude from this valuation analysis that cross listing does indeed enhance firm value through its effect on the firm's information environment.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine whether cross listing on U.S. stock exchanges improves the information environment, and, ultimately, the valuation of non-U.S. firms. We document several interesting findings: First, we show that non-U.S. firms that cross list enjoy greater analyst coverage and increased forecast accuracy relative to other firms that are not cross-listed. Second, a time series analysis shows that the change in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy occurs around the cross-listing period. Third, we document that firms that have more analyst coverage and higher forecast accuracy have a higher valuation. Finally, we show that ADR firms with greater improvements in information environment around cross listing also experience larger increases in valuations, which is consistent with these firms enjoying a lower cost of capital or improved corporate governance.
These findings have important implications for several strands of research. The large literature on international cross-listings suggests that information disclosure plays a key role in the cross-listing decision. While theory predicts firms that cross-list on a more transparent exchange should be valued more highly, there has been little direct empirical evidence regarding the role of information disclosure and its impact on cross-listing. Our findings provide evidence that important changes occur in the information environment of firms around cross-listing and that these changes are rewarded with higher valuations by the market. In addition, since other factors such as investor protection and agency problems have been argued to be important to the cross-listing decision, our findings suggest control variables that may allow for a more detailed examination of other benefits to cross-listing.
Our findings also are consistent with the literature that links disclosure to the cost of capital. Theoretical research like Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Baiman and Verrecchia 25 (1996) indicates that a commitment to increase disclosure (and, hence, to reduce information asymmetries) will be rewarded with a reduced cost of capital. Our findings that link analyst activity and firm value around cross-listing are consistent with these theories and complement recent empirical work such as Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Gebhart, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001).
Finally, our results can also be viewed as additional indirect evidence in the debate on the costs and benefits of high-quality accounting standards. While not a direct test of the effects of disclosure requirements, our results on the economic impact of increased disclosure around cross-listing should at least be of interest to policy makers considering a change in reporting standards, since much of the debate centers on the benefits of disclosure.
Table 1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
ADRs refer to the number firms with cross-listings that trade in the U.S that require reconciliation to U.S. GAAP reporting standards. Analyst is defined as the median number of IBES analysts that report estimates for each firm. Forecast accuracy is for fiscal year 1996 and is defined as the negative of the absolute value of the deviation of actual earnings per share from the median analyst forecast of earnings per share, deflated by stock price. Forecast accuracy is winsorized at the 5 th percentile. Size is the median value of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars. Return is the median stock return over the previous year. ADRs refer to the number firms with cross-listings that trade in the U.S that require reconciliation to U.S. GAAP reporting standards. Analyst is defined as the median number of IBES analysts that report estimates for each firm. Forecast accuracy is for fiscal year 1996 and is defined as the negative of the absolute value of the deviation of actual earnings per share from the median analyst forecast of earnings per share, deflated by stock price. Forecast accuracy is winsorized at the 5 th percentile. Size is the median value of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars. Return is the median stock return over the previous year. 
Table 2 Multivariate Tests of Analyst Coverage
Regression estimates of analyst coverage on disclosure variables of interest and controls. Analyst coverage is for fiscal year 1996 and is defined as the number of IBES analysts that report estimates for each firm. 'XLIST' is an indicator variable that takes on the value one if the firm has securities traded in the U.S that require reconciliation to U.S. GAAP reporting standards. Firm size is the log of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars. Stock is the log of the amount of new equity issued during year t-1 (in thousands of US dollars). Returns-Earnings Correlation is the correlation between returns and earnings over the previous three years. Return STD is the standard deviation of the returns over the previous three years. Earnings Surprise is the absolute value of the difference between current earnings per share and earnings per share from the prior year, divided by the firm's stock price. Dummy variables for IBES industry classification (over 100 classifications -broadly corresponding to 2-digit SIC codes) are included but not reported. The standard deviation of return on equity is winsorized at the 95 th percentile. All regression models are estimated using country random effects. We verify that the Hausman test does not reject the null that country effects are random. The p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality of the coefficient to zero is reported in parentheses.
Full Sample
Sample 
Table 3 Multivariate Tests of Forecast Accuracy
Regression estimates of analyst accuracy on disclosure variables of interest and controls. Forecast accuracy is for fiscal year 1996 and is defined as the negative of the absolute value of the analyst forecast error, deflated by stock price. 'XLIST' is an indicator variable that takes on the value one if the firm has securities traded in the U.S that require reconciliation to U.S. GAAP reporting standards. Firm size is the log of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars. Fundamentals is a score equal to the number of fundamental variables (see text for list of variables) in the extreme quartiles of the distribution in year t-1 divided by the number of available variables. Returns-Earnings Correlation is the correlation between returns and earnings over the previous 4 years. Return STD is the standard deviation of the returns over the previous 4 years. Earnings Surprise is the absolute value of the difference between current earnings per share and earnings per share from the prior year, divided by the firm's stock price. Dummy variables for IBES industry classification (over 100 classifications -broadly corresponding to 2-digit SIC codes) are included but not reported. Standard deviation of return on equity is winsorized at the 95 th percentile. All regression models are estimated using country random effects. We verify that the Hausman test does not reject the null that country effects are random. The p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality of the coefficient to zero is reported in parentheses.
Full Sample
Sample Time-series regression estimates of analyst coverage and analyst forecast accuracy on disclosure variables of interest and controls. Forecast accuracy is defined as the negative of the absolute value of the analyst forecast error, deflated by stock price. Analyst coverage is defined as the number of IBES analysts that report estimates for each firm. "Post-ADR" is a dummy variable set equal to one for the years in the panel dataset that fall after the year that the firm listed its ADR. The table reports regressions estimated using 3 years pre-and post-ADR data with the Post-ADR dummy centered on the ADR year. Regressions do not include data for the year of the listing. Prior Year Return is the total stock return over the previous year. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors with by firm clusters that account for a lack of independence between the observations of each firm are reported. The p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality of the coefficient to zero is reported in parentheses. Regression estimates of Tobin's Q on disclosure variables of interest and controls. Tobin's Q is computed as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity in the numerator and book value of assets in the denominator. Tobin's Q is computed using data predominantly from fiscal year 1996. Firms with financial services industry classifications are excluded from the regressions. Forecast accuracy is for fiscal year 1996 and is defined as the negative of the absolute value of the analyst forecast error, deflated by stock price. Number of analysts is defined as the median number of IBES analysts that report estimates for each firm. Firm size is the log of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars. Profit is operating income deflated by total asets, in US dollars. Sales growth is the year t-1 to t sales growth rate. All regressions are estimated using unreported dummy variables for IBES industry classification (over 100 classifications -broadly corresponding to 2-digit SIC codes) and country of domicile. The probit model of self-selection is the same as the one in Table 4 and is therefore not reported.
Regressions are estimated with heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors. The p-value of the two-tailed ttest of equality of the coefficient to zero is reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regression models is the change in Tobin's Q from the year before the ADR to the year after the ADR (a two-year change). For each year, Tobin's Q is computed as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity in the numerator and book value of assets in the denominator. The independent variables are the changes in the residual levels of analyst coverage and forecast accuracy from the year before the ADR to the year after the ADR. To obtain residuals in each year, we regress either analyst coverage or forecast accuracy on firm size, the standard deviation of returns, the returns to earnings correlation, and the earnings surprise for the years 1990 to 1998. Forecast accuracy is defined as the negative of the absolute value of the analyst forecast error, deflated by stock price. Number of analysts is defined as the median number of IBES analysts that report estimates for each firm. The models used in computing the residual values correspond exactly to Model 2 of Tables 2 and 3 , with the exception of our size control, which uses the market value of equity rather than a firm's total assets. This substitution avoids a substantial loss of observations in the early years due to poor Worldscope coverage. We refer to the residual values each year as measures of a firm's "excess analyst following" and "excess forecast accuracy." Our regressions of changes in Tobin's Q on changes in excess analyst and accuracy are estimated with heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors. The p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality of the coefficient to zero is reported in parentheses. 
